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BILINGUAL INTERPRETATION OF
ENACTMENTS IN CANADA:
PRINCIPLES V. PRACTICE
Pierre-André Côté*
I. INTRODUCTION

C

anada’s experience with the interpretation of bilingual
laws goes back a long way. For example, the Civil Code
of Lower Canada, which came into force in 1866, contained a
provision to guide interpreters in the resolution of problems
caused by differences in the French and English versions of the
Code.1 Canadian courts have established a method for dealing
with problems of interpretation of bilingual laws by building on
the experience of many generations of jurists.
Anyone wishing to become familiar with the interpretive
method would normally turn to a textbook on statutory interpretation, like my colleague Ruth Sullivan’s excellent fourth
edition of Elmer Driedger’s Construction of Statutes.2 Professor
Sullivan provides an accurate description of the way bilingual
statutes ought to be interpreted, based on numerous judicial
dicta and decisions, most from the Supreme Court of Canada
* Professor, Université de Montréal. The author was born in Montréal,
Québec, Canada and holds degrees from the University of Montréal (B.A.
1964; LL.L 1967) and the Université de Toulouse, France (D.E.S. 1969). Since
1970, he has been Professor of Law at the University of Montréal. He has
taught and published mainly in Administrative Law, Statutory Interpretation
and Transitional Law. Admitted to the Québec Bar in 1968, he is presently
counsel in the Montréal law firm of Bélanger, Sauvé.
1 Civil Code of Lower Canada § 2615 (1866) (Can.):
If in any article of this code founded on the laws existing at the time
of its promulgation, there be a difference between the English and
French text, that version shall prevail which is most consistent with
the provisions of the existing laws on which the article is founded;
and if there be any such difference in an article changing the existing
laws, that version shall prevail which is more consistent with the intention of the article, and the ordinary rules of legal interpretation
shall apply in determining such intention.
Id.
2. RUTH SULLIVAN, SULLIVAN
STATUTES (4th ed. 2002).
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and some going back to the 19 century.3 As accurate as that
description may be, however, I believe Professor Sullivan would
agree that it does not necessarily reflect how bilingual legislation is actually interpreted in day-to-day legal practice in Canada. In fact, there are few areas of Canadian law where the
contrast between “law in the books” and “law in practice” is
more obvious.
While applicable legal principles require a bilingual reading
and interpretation of bilingual legislation, practitioners are
usually satisfied with an unilingual approach to bilingual texts.
The purpose of this Article is to substantiate and illustrate this
assertion and to examine some of the reasons for this situation.
To do so, it will first summarize briefly the legal principles governing the interpretation of bilingual legislation in Canada, and
then examine the various ways in which legal practice deviates
from these principles.
A. Principles
Canadian courts have, over the years, developed principles of
interpretation addressing the unique challenges presented by
legal norms enacted in two different but equal linguistic versions. From these principles flow a method for interpreting bilingual texts, which can be presented through four methodological principles.
1. First principle: Bilingual statutes
should be given a bilingual interpretation.
The Canadian Parliament enacts legal texts, not legal norms.
The rules or norms have to be constructed by the readers of
those texts, taking into account numerous factors, starting, of
course, with the text of the law. This process of constructing
legal norms which starts by reviewing the text of the law is
what I mean by “interpretation.”
Since both linguistic versions of bilingual legislation constitute authentic expressions of the law (in effect, it might be better to say that they form together but one bilingual and authori-

3. See id. at 73, 94.
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tative text of the law),4 someone cannot claim to correctly interpret a bilingual legislative text if they ignore one half of the text
being interpreted. Thus, bilingual legislation requires bilingual
interpretation, that is, an interpretation that takes into account
the complete text of the law, which includes both an English
and a French version.5
If we could be sure that there were no discrepancies between
the two versions, we could arguably make do with an unilingual
approach to bilingual texts. Since these discrepancies are present and even unavoidable, the only conclusion is that the best
and most prudent way to interpret bilingual legislation is to
consider both versions.
2. Second principle: In interpreting bilingual statutes, both
versions should be attributed the same importance or weight.
Not only are both versions of a bilingual statute or regulation
authentic, they are also to be considered as equally authentic.6
Equality of both versions carries, of course, enormous symbolic
significance: neither French nor English speakers want to be
considered second class citizens. On a more practical level,
what has been called the “equal authenticity rule” states that
both versions should contribute equally to the meaning of a
given provision. 7 For example, even if one version is known to
4. See, e.g., Roderick A. MacDonald, Legal Bilingualism, 42 MCGILL L.J.
119, 160–61 (1997):
Just as drafters of bilingual legislation are engaged in the translation
of a single juridical idea into two natural languages, interpreters
would come to accept that knowledge of one version alone is an insufficient point of reference for understanding the idea in question.
They would understand legislative texts as fully embracing both English and French connotations and contexts, and as necessarily meaning what both versions say. No longer would it be possible to speak of
two texts being equally authoritative. To the extent that any formulation of a legal rule can be authoritative, it will be necessary to
speak of one authoritative bilingual text in French and English.
Id.
5. See SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 77-78.
6. See SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 74–77 (emphasis added). See also R v.
Cie Imm. BCN Ltee, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 865, 871 (acknowledging that § 8(1) of the
1970 Official Languages Act specified that both English and French versions
of legislative enactments were “equally authentic”).
7. See SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 74–77.
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be simply a translation of the other, this is not, per se, an acceptable reason to give it less consideration.
3. Third principle: Discrepancies in the two versions are
to be treated as any other ambiguity and, subject
to the fourth principle, must be resolved by resorting
to the usual method of interpretation.
Where the reading of both the French and English versions
reveals differences of meaning, the problem should be approached as a problem of ambiguity. Even though, there are
two linguistic versions, there can be but one valid rule associated with a given provision in relation to particular facts. A
choice thus has to be made, and the version to be favored will be
determined by taking into account all the factors usually relevant to the ascertainment of statutory meaning. In the conventional rhetoric of statutory interpretation, it is said that the
version which best reflects the “intention of Parliament” should
prevail.8
The “literal meaning” of each version still retains some relevance, in that the words used in both versions of the provision
being interpreted will determine the semantic possibilities of
the text.9 The “ordinary” or “technical” meaning, however,
cannot be a factor in the selection of the best interpretation because, in cases of divergence, both versions, being of equal
weight, cancel each other out as it were, at least at the textual
level.10
4. Fourth principle: In case of discrepancies, the meaning
shared by both versions, if one can be found, constitutes a factor
which should be considered in the interpretation of the provision, in addition to all the other relevant factors.
When the two versions do not express the same thing, one
should try to reconcile them. In order to do that, Canadian
courts will look for the meaning that can be attributed indis-

8. Doré v. Verdun (City of), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, 879. See SULLIVAN, supra
note 2, 87–90.
9. See SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 74–77.
10. See id.
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tinctively to the two versions, the meaning which is shared by
the two, the meaning that is common to both of them.11
Sometimes, such a meaning cannot be found, and the interpreter will have to forgo textual considerations and resort to
other means of resolving the ambiguity.12 In other cases, one
version is ambiguous, equivocal, and the other is clear, unequivocal.13 The clear version should be preferred. In a third
category of instances, one version has wider meaning than the
other: the version with the narrower meaning, which is shared
by both versions, would then be favoured.14
When a shared meaning can be found, it constitutes merely a
supplemental factor in the search for the best meaning of the
provision. It will, however, be ignored if it is felt that it does
not correctly reflect the intention of Parliament.15
The four principles just described would most likely be followed today by the Supreme Court of Canada in attributing
meaning to a bilingual statute. Interpretation, however, is not
a monopoly of the Supreme Court’s. Interpretation is part of
the every day activities of jurists, and there are many reasons
to believe that the method required by these principles is seldom followed in practice.
B. Practice
When a subject has been as well studied as the legally accepted method for interpreting bilingual legislation in Canada,16
research is made easy. The situation is different when dealing
with law in practice. Unless you can rely on empirical research,
the task is a lot more difficult.
To my knowledge, such empirical research into the interpretive practices of Canadian jurists simply does not exist. This
absence is in itself surprising. Could it be that, as proud as we
Canadians may be of the principles our courts have developed,
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See id. at 81–87.
Id. at 90–92.
Id. at 82–83.
Id.
Id. at 87–90.
See generally SULLIVAN, supra note 2; see generally RÉMI MICHAEL
BEAUPRÉ, INTERPRETING BILINGUAL LEGISLATION (2d ed. 1986); see generally
PIERRE-ANDRE CÔTÉ, THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA 323–32
(Katherine Lippel & Douglas J. Simsovic trans., 3d ed. 2000).
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we are a bit embarrassed by the way these principles are in effect implemented in day-to-day legal practice? English-French
bilingualism is a touchy matter in Canada, and certain subjects
may be thought to be better left untouched.17
Absent such empirical research, I have had to draw, for this
Article, on some 40 years of experience first as a law student
and later as a lawyer and law professor in Montréal, on conversations with colleagues at the Université de Montréal and at
the law firm with which I am associated and, obviously, I have
drawn also on what I could find in books, essentially in law reports and law review articles. In a country as vast and diverse
as Canada, this approach is obviously flawed in some way. One
can safely say, for example, that the interpretation of bilingual
legislation is bound to be conducted differently in Montréal and
Toronto. One takes place in a largely bilingual environment
where the majority is French-speaking and the other in a
largely unilingual English-speaking community.18 Again, the
day-to-day practice of bilingual interpretation by different jurists in the same linguistic, social and cultural environment
may vary considerably as a function of individual linguistic
skills and areas of practice.
My point of view is thus based largely on experience, intuition
and educated guesses. This Article proposes hypotheses for further empirical research. I hope that, even in this form, it will
be found useful.
In my opinion, the method of interpretation suggested by the
four principles described earlier is seldom applied in Canadian
legal practice. By legal practice, I am not referring only to interpretation by the courts: every time a meaning is attributed to
an enactment by its reader, the text is being interpreted. Bilingual legislative texts are rarely interpreted in Canada according to the method identified by the courts as the method to be
followed.
17. See, e.g., Thomas W. Simon, Minorities in International Law, 10 CAN.
J.L. & JURIS. 507, 518 (1997).
18. See Statistics Canada, Population by Knowledge of Official Language,
Census Metropolitan Areas (2001), available at http://www.statcan.ca/english/
Pgdb/demo19b.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004). In Montréal, 53% of the population knows both official languages and 91% of the population speaks French.
Id. In Toronto, only 8% of the population knows both official languages and
96% of the population speaks English. Id.

File: Cote5.19.04macro.doc

2004]

Created on: 5/19/2004 5:08 PM

Last Printed: 6/25/2004 12:46 PM

PRINCIPLES V. PRACTICE

1073

The deviations from the principles observed in practice take
essentially three distinct forms. There are many reasons to believe that, in the majority of instances, only one version is considered. This approach reflects what has been called “legal dualism.”19 In other instances, the version which is not the one in
day-to-day use will be viewed only as an aid to interpretation.
This is what I will call “occasional bilingualism.” Finally, when
the two versions are considered, they may not be accorded the
same weight. I will call this “unequal bilingualism.”
1. Legal dualism
The term “legal dualism” was used by Roderick MacDonald to
describe a situation where official bilingualism translates, in
practice, into two legal unilingualisms.20 Paradigmatic instances of this situation would be an English-speaking lawyer
in Vancouver using exclusively the English version of the
Criminal Code of Canada, a bilingual federal statute, or a
French-speaking lawyer in Québec City relying exclusively on
the French version of the Civil Code of Québec, a bilingual Québec law. The method of interpretation favoured by this approach is simple: choose one version of the statute…and adhere
to it, regardless of the outcome. The “other version” is completely ignored, creating a unilingual interpretation of a bilingual text.
At no time in my career have I been made more aware of legal
dualism than one morning a little more than 20 years ago while
I was preparing a lecture on a Supreme Court of Canada decision that was to become probably the leading case in modern
Canadian Administrative Law.21 The case dealt with the question of judicial control of interpretations, by an administrative
agency, of the statute the administrative agency was entrusted
to apply. The Supreme Court decided that the text interpreted
by the agency was ambiguous (there were, in the opinion of the
Court, at least four different interpretations that could be sustained), that there was not one interpretation that could be said
to be “right” and that since the conclusion arrived at by the
agency was not “so patently unreasonable that its construction
19. See MacDonald, supra note 4, at 154.
20. Id.
21. C.U.P.E. v. N.B. Liquor Corporation, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227.

File: Cote5.19.04macro.doc

1074

Created on: 5/19/2004 5:08 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 6/25/2004 12:46 PM

[Vol. 29:3

cannot be rationally supported by the relevant legislation,” intervention by the Court was not warranted. 22
Since I teach in French, I naturally was preparing my lecture
by reading the French version of the Court’s decision, which
contained the official French version of the Province of NewBrunswick statute being interpreted.23 Reading the French version many times, I simply could not find the ambiguity at the
center of the controversy, and for good reason: the French text
was unequivocal…but nobody seemed to have noticed, not even
the members of the Supreme Court.
It is true that case was decided 24 years ago and a unilingual
reading of a bilingual statute would certainly not happen today
at the Supreme Court level. Recent experience shows, however,
that it is still the practice of some lawyers and judges, even at
the appellate level, to rely on one version only. In the recent
case R. v. Mac,24 the Supreme Court of Canada, realized that
the French version of the Criminal Code of Canada (a federal
and thus bilingual statute) had not been considered in the
courts below. The Court rescheduled the hearing in order for
the parties to make submissions taking into account the French
version. The Court eventually ruled by giving considerable
weight to that version.
To reduce the possibility of parties before the Supreme Court
simply ignoring one version of a bilingual legislative text, the
new Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada enacted in April
2002 now require the reproduction in the factum and in the
book of authorities of both versions of all legislative texts that,
by law, have to be printed in both languages.25 When the Supreme Court has to resort to its rule-making powers in order to
incite litigants to take into account both versions of bilingual
legislative texts, one can easily imagine what goes on in everyday legal practice.
Among the causes of legal dualism, MacDonald identifies
what he calls “rampant unilingualism among legal elites.”26 To
22. Id. at 237.
23. This official nature of the French version flowed at the time from the
Official Languages of New Brunswick Act, R.S.N.B. ch. O.1 (1973)(Can.).
24. R. v. Mac, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 856.
25. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/DORS/2002-156, C.Gaz.,
pt. II, vol. 136, no. 9, s. 42(2)(b) (April 24, 2002).
26. MacDonald, supra note 4, at 156.
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interpret bilingually bilingual texts, it evidently helps to have
at least a passive knowledge of French and English. As the following table published by Statistics Canada indicates,27 bilingualism in Canada is generally not at a high level, except in the
two provinces of Québec and New-Brunswick, where members
of the French-speaking minority are concentrated.
English-French Bilingualism
1971
1981
1991
Canada
13.4%
15.3
16.3
Newfoundland
1.8
2.3
3.3
and Labrador
Prince Edward
8.2
8.1
10.1
Island
Nova Scotia
6.7
7.4
8.6
New Brunswick
21.5
26.5
29.5
Québec
27.6
32.4
35.4
Ontario
9.3
10.8
11.4
Manitoba
8.2
7.9
9.2
Saskatchewan
5.0
4.6
5.2
Alberta
5.0
6.4
6.6
British Columbia
4.6
5.7
6.4
Yukon Territory
6.6
7.9
9.3
Northwest
6.1
6.0
6.1
Territories
Nunavut
–
–
–

2001
17.7
4.1
12.0
10.1
34.2
40.8
11.7
9.3
5.1
6.9
7.0
10.1
8.3
3.8

A comparison of metropolitan areas by language of population
confirms the vast differences between, for example, Toronto,
where the level of bilingualism stands at 8%, Vancouver, where
7.5% of the population is bilingual and Montréal, where bilingualism stands at 53%.28

27. Statistics Canada, 2001 Census, English-French Bilingualism,
available at www.12.statsca/english/census01/teacher’s_kit/activity8_table5.
cfm (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
28. Statistics Canada, 2001 Census, Population by knowledge of official
language, census metropolitan areas, available at www.statscan.ca/english/
Pgdb/demo19b.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
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Now, one may argue that these statistics do not reveal the
level of bilingualism in the legal profession, where, it can be
surmised, practitioners tend to be more educated and bilingualism more important considering, in particular, its role in legislation. It is not easy to obtain information about the language
characteristics of the Canadian legal profession. The best I
have been able to do is to look at the membership of the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice,29 which, as of
August 26, 2003, had 1,054 members, 55% of which are judges
of various Courts in Canada, the rest being essentially members
of the Bar from across Canada.
Among those 1,054 members, 799 (76%) declare themselves to
be English-speaking. Of that number, 46, or 6%, are bilingual.
Of the 255 French-speaking members (24% of the total membership), 161 or 63% are bilingual. The hypothesis that bilingualism is more frequent in the legal profession than in the
general population is true of the French-speaking jurists, but
not for the English speakers.30
The nature of the tools Canadian practitioners use on a daily
basis to access the text of legislation constitutes a cause as well
as a consequence of legal dualism. In English Canada, the
French version tends to be omitted from annotated codes and
statutes. If you open, for example, any edition of the celebrated
Martin’s Annual Criminal Code,31 you will not find anywhere
the French version of the Criminal Code or of related statutes,
although all were bilingually drafted, adopted and published,
and even though those texts are all supposed to be subject to a
bilingual method of interpretation. The same could be said for
most annotated federal or constitutional statutes published in
English Canada.32

29. For more information on the Canadian Institute for the Administration
of Justice, see http://www.ciaj-icaj.ca.
30. I wish to thank Mrs. Christine Robertson, executive director of Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice for this information.
31. EDWARD L. GREENSPAN, Q.C. & MARC ROSENBERG, MARTIN’S ANNUAL
CRIMINAL CODE 2004 (2004).
32. See, e.g., L. W. HOULDEN & GEOFFREY B. MORAWETZ, THE 2003
ANNOTATED BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT (2003); MAHMUD JAMAL &
MATTHEW TAYLOR, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS IN LITIGATION (2003).
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French-speaking authors tend to publish federal and Québec
codes and statutes in both languages,33 although there are more
and more exceptions.34 In 1977, the Québec government ceased
to publish the French and the English versions of its statutes
side-by-side, so bilingual interpretation of Québec statutes has
since then become more difficult. However, commercial publications of bilingual editions of the Civil Code, of the Code of Civil
Procedure and of other statutes in some measure alleviate the
problems created by the physical separation of the French and
English versions in governmental publications.
When a lawyer works in daily practice with the unilingual
text of a bilingual statute, an interpretation process resting on
both official versions is not necessarily excluded, but chances
are that approach will not be resorted to except where special
circumstances require it. I call this “occasional bilingualism.”
2. Occasional bilingualism
Interpretive principles require that bilingual interpretation
be systematic. Since both versions should serve as a starting
point for construction of legal norms, both have to be taken into
account every time a statute is given meaning. In everyday
practice, however, and this certainly characterizes the approach
dominant in the bilingual environment of Montréal, only one
version is in daily use and the other version is looked at occasionally, when special circumstances seem to justify it. This
happens, notably, when there is a need for confirmation of the
meaning of the dominant version, or when that version’s meaning is doubtful and requires clarification. It goes without saying
that this approach is encouraged when the French and English
versions are not published side-by-side, but in separate documents.
The law firm where I act as counsel has an important municipal law practice. Municipal legislation is within the jurisdiction of the province.35 Québec municipal legislation is first
33. See, e.g., YVON MARTINEAU, MANUEL DES CORPORATIONS DU QUÉBEC
[MANUAL OF QUÉBEC CORPORATIONS] (1994); GEORGE T. ROBIC, ET. AL.
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT ACT ANNOTATED (2003).
34. See, e.g., THERIAULT & FORTIN, DROIT DES VALEURS MOBILIÈRES [THE
LAW OF TRANSFERABLE SECURITIES ] (2001).
35. Constitution Act 1867 (U.K.), 30-31 Vict., ch. 3, s. 92(8).
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drafted in French and then translated into English.36 Lawyers
practicing municipal law tell me that they tend to use the
French version in daily practice, but, since they are generally
bilingual, that they will turn to the English version only when
special circumstances justify it.
There is reason to think that this opportunistic use of bilingualism is not limited to Québec jurists. Many years ago, as I
was reading a law review article about the interpretation of the
then recently enacted Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,37 I was shocked to read that, among the sources the author said one could look at to assist in the interpretation of the
Charter, the French version of the Charter figured in sixth
place!38 This is especially troubling, considering that the English and French versions of the Charter are declared to be
“equally authoritative” by Section 57 of the Constitution Act,
1982.39
The recourse to the other version simply as an aid to interpretation can be criticized as not being compatible with the
equal authenticity rule, but one wonders whether a systematic
bilingual approach is possible in daily legal practice. Even
where knowledge of both official languages is not an obstacle to
a bilingual method, it seems that, inevitably, one version will
tend to dominate and the other will be relegated to an auxiliary
role. This reflects a kind of practitioner’s custom or working
habit which is very hard to change. If we take as an example
the interpretation of Québec municipal legislation, the statutes
are drafted in Québec City in French in a French-speaking environment.40 The texts are discussed in the Québec National

36. LUC GAGNÉ, LE PROCESSUS LÉGISLATIF ET RÉGLEMENTAIRE AU QUÉBEC
[THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PROCESS IN QUÉBEC] 29–31 (Yvon Blais ed.,
1997). Nicole Fernbach, Getting the Message Across in Languages Other than
English: The Canadian example [sic], Presentation to the Fourth Biennieal
Conference of the PLAIN Language Association International (September 27,
2002) at http://www.nald.ca/PROVINCE/ONT/PLAIN/message/1.htm.
37. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms).
38. Robin Elliot, Interpreting the Charter—Use of Earlier Versions as an
Aid U.B.C.L. REV. (Charter Edition) 11, 12–13 (1982).
39. CAN CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. VII (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), §57.
40. GAGNÉ, supra note 36, at 29–31.
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Assembly in their French version only. 41 The English version is
a translation. The practitioner working with the French version of the Cities and Town’s Act,42 for example, knows this.
What is the incentive to look systematically at the English version? Either it says the same thing as the French, and it may
be seen as useless, or it contradicts the French, and it is possible that the French version will be preferred by a court as being
the original and thus best version.
One thing seems sure: if occasional bilingualism did not work
well in practice, it would very likely be abandoned. Occasional
bilingualism may be an error, but error communis facit jus. The
same could be said of the unilingual interpretation of bilingual
texts in many parts of Canada: as long as everybody in a given
milieu ignores the French or the English version, there is no
real practical problem.
I have just hinted at the possibility that the Québec Courts
may favour the original version of a statute over its translation.
This illustrates the third manner in which practice may deviate
from principles.
3. Unequal bilingualism
The French and English versions of Canadian bilingual legislation are supposed to be equally authoritative.43 To this equality at the normative level, however, does not always correspond
an equality at the factual level.
For example, it would seem obvious that when a text was first
conceived in one linguistic version, then drafted, discussed in
Parliament and adopted in that version, the other version being
simply a translation of the final draft, more weight in interpretation to the version considered as the original will usually be
given. As Roderick MacDonald points out, legal bilingualism is
not really compatible with the production of dual versions by a
process of translation.44 Even when both versions have been
drafted as originals, the simple fact that the ministerial in41. Debates of the Québec National Assembly can be consulted at
www.assnat.qc.ca.
42. City and Towns Act, R.S.Q., ch. C-19 (Can.).
43. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the equal authenticity rule).
44. See MacDonald, supra note 4, at 148.
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structions preceding the drafting process result from discussions that have taken place in one language only and are themselves drafted in that language will be detectable by interpreters, who will accordingly tend to attach more weight in their
approach to the statute to the version drafted in the language of
the ministerial instructions.45
The process of ordering both versions in terms of their reliability or persuasive weight is rarely apparent in case law, because it contravenes the equal authenticity principle, but it is
not completely absent. In one of the leading cases on the interpretation of bilingual legislation, R. v. Compagnie Immobilière
B.C.N., the Supreme Court compared the wording of the French
and English versions of a federal tax regulation.46 At the time,
the French version of those regulations as well as the French
version of the Income Tax Act47 were translations of the original
English version. In giving precedence to the English version,
the Court underlined the fact that, while the English version of
the Act used consistently the same words in relation to the
problem before the Court,48 the French version used different
words in a seemingly arbitrary fashion.49 This was sufficient to
suggest that the French version, although official, was unreliable and should not prevail in cases of conflict with the English
version.
More recently, the Supreme Court issued its first decision interpreting the new Québec Civil Code50 in the case of Doré v.
Verdun (City of).51 Section 2930 of the Code contained a divergence between the French and English versions.52 The Québec
Court of Appeal had given precedence to the French version.53
45. See id.
46. R. v. Compagnie Immobilière B.C.N, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 865.
47. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. ch. 148 (1952)(Can.).
48. See Compagnie Immobilière B.C.N, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 865, 870–77 (discussing the expressions “disposition,” “proceeds of disposition,” and “disposed
of”).
49. Id. at 871–74 (noting that in section 20 of the English version of the
Income Tax Act, the expression “disposed of” appeared thirteen times. In
seven of those occurrences, the French equivalent was “disposé," and in six,
“aliéne.”)
50. Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. ch. 64 (1991)(Can.)
51. Doré v. Verdun (City of), [1997] 2 R.C.S 862.
52. Id. at 880.
53. Id. at 878–79.
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As one of the reasons for this choice, the appellate judge stated
that the English version of the Code was “merely a translation”
of the original French version, a translation that “did not meet
with everyone’s approval” and suggested that it should not be
given equal weight because of its unreliability, citing the well
known Italian aphorism: Traduttore, traditore (Translator, traitor).54 This approach was clearly rejected by the Supreme Court
of Canada, where Mr. Justice Gonthier, while acknowledging
that it was “unfortunately true” that the English version of the
Code was a translation, stated that this fact could not be used
to set aside an argument based on that version because to do so
would be incompatible with the equal authenticity and equal
status of both versions mandated by the Constitution.55
The fact that a version does not appear to be as reliable as
the other because it is a translation is probably not the only circumstance where unequal bilingualism may be encountered.
Some areas of Canadian law are inextricably linked by history
with one language and even if both linguistic versions are
drafted as originals, one version will tend to dominate. According to professor (and now dean) Nicholas Kasirer of McGill University, “the Anglo-Canadian tradition in criminal law is deeply
rooted in the English language” and the application of the equal
authenticity principle in this area of Canadian law “is a myth
that no-one really believes, but that everyone swears by.”56
Québec criminal lawyers are quite aware of this, and colleagues
who teach criminal law in French tell me that they feel the English version of criminal legislation tends to dominate even in
the French-speaking interpretive environment.
Considerations of fairness may also impact on the weight
given to a linguistic version of a statute. For example, Canadian Law recognizes the importance of giving citizens fair notice
as to what conduct is prohibited under pain of criminal penalty.57 Canadian Constitutional Law also considers that lack of

54. Verdun (City of) v. Doré, [1995] R.J.Q. 1321 at para. 24.
55. Doré v. Verdun (City of), [1997] 2 R.C.S. 862, 878–79.
56. Nicholas Kasirer, The Annotated Criminal Code en Version Québécoise:
Signs of Territoriality in Canadian Criminal Law, 13 DALHOUSIE L.J. 520, 553
(1990).
57. See generally R. v. McIntosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686.
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fair notice may invalidate a statute that is excessively vague.58
In a criminal trial, if the version drafted in the language of the
accused does not reveal an offense while the other does, a judge
might well feel justified, on grounds of fairness, in giving precedence to the version the accused, his lawyer, the jury, and eventually, the judge himself, are able to read and understand.
The Supreme Court of Canada has recently decided a case
from Québec59 where the French version of the Criminal Code
described an offense more narrowly than the English one, with
the result that the conduct of the accused could be seen as being
prohibited by the English version, but not by the version
drafted in the language of the accused, a French-speaking resident of Québec City. Even though, in the opinion of the Court,
the English version best reflected Parliamentary intent and the
French version contained a drafting error, the French version
was preferred, essentially on grounds of fairness.60
II. CONCLUSION
At first glance, the state of bilingual interpretation of statutes
in Canada seems to be a cause for concern. The recommended
method for giving meaning to bilingual statutes appears to be
rarely followed in everyday legal practice. I believe, however,
that this situation, though it could certainly be made better, is
understandable.
First, it must be remembered that bilingual drafting of statutes reflects a constitutional or legal policy of making written
law equally accessible to English-speaking and French-speaking
Canadians. Equal authenticity says to members of both language-groups that they are entitled to rely on the version written in their own language. Bilingual drafting is premised on
the fact that a majority of Canadians are either French or English-speaking and suggests that members of both language
groups are entitled to rely exclusively on the version drafted in
their own language.
The principles developed by the courts, however, state that
the best way to give meaning to a bilingual statute is to take
58. See generally R. v. Pharmaceutical Society (Nova Scotia), [1992] 2
S.C.R. 606.
59. R. v. Daoust, [2004] S.C.C. 6.
60. See id. at paras. 35 and 37.
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both versions as a starting point, which requires some degree of
bilingualism on the part of the interpreter. One cannot fault the
courts for arriving at the conclusion that the best and most
prudent way to interpret bilingual legislation is to give equal
consideration to both texts. How could they decide otherwise?
The idea that the language of the parties would determine
which version the courts should consider in giving meaning to a
text is untenable, because it means that in the case of discrepancies, there would in fact be two valid rules that could be constructed from a single provision, and, furthermore, that these
rules would apply differently depending on the language spoken
by the Canadian in question.
Is there a way to reconcile the reality of a mainly unilingual
legal profession with the requirements of institutional bilingualism? Maybe the solution is to think of the judge-made
principles relating to the interpretation of bilingual statutes not
as stating conditions for an interpretation to be valid, but as
simply suggesting the best way to proceed. Interpretation by
the Courts and interpretation in day-to-day legal practice take
place under vastly different conditions. The constraints of time,
money and limited human resources and skills that characterize everyday or routine interpretations are rarely present in
judicial interpretation, especially at the highest levels.
For example, Canadian courts have recently accepted the
view that examining Parliamentary or legislative history is an
appropriate way of interpreting statutes, as it may give useful
insights into the context surrounding the adoption of a given
text. One can certainly assert that an interpretation which
takes into account the Parliamentary history of a provision is to
be preferred to one that ignores it, but this does not justify the
conclusion that an interpretation which is arrived at without
having resort to this kind of information is necessarily invalid
or improper. The same could be said for a great number of elements that are considered relevant to the interpretation of a
statute, like the previous state of the law, the content of related
legislation and doctrinal writings on the interpretation of a specific provision.
All information comes with a cost, and practitioners will tend
to balance this cost against the perceived advantages provided
by the information eventually obtained. The result of this balancing operation will evidently vary widely based on circumstances. From judicial interpretation, especially at the appel-
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late level, we expect the best level of information to be brought
to bear on the results, and a lawyer preparing a factum for the
Supreme Court of Canada on the interpretation of a statutory
provision would be well advised not to ignore any element considered relevant by the Court, including, evidently, the two versions of the statute.
This situation is very different from what happens in routine
interpretations during daily legal practice. The constraints of
everyday practice simply do not allow for the gathering of the
same quantity of information as what may be considered to be
the best. Practitioners must often be content with a satisfactory level of information, with what is “good enough” as opposed
to what is best. More often that not, this may mean that only
one version of a bilingual statute will be considered, but when
the meaning of that version seems in need of confirmation or
clarification, the other will be consulted if the cost of doing so is
perceived to be reasonable in comparison with the advantages.
This cost will vary, notably, with the linguistic skills of the interpreter and whether the other version is easily accessible.
The perceived advantages will depend in particular on the value
the environment in which the interpretation occurs places on a
bilingual approach to statutes.
Mainly because of the linguistic characteristics of the interpreters and of the working habits of the legal profession, the
assignment of meaning to bilingual statutes in Canada is, in my
opinion, only exceptionally done by a systematic and careful
examination of both French and English versions. The gulf between theory and practice thus runs deep and, given the obstacles in the way of a truly bilingual approach to statutes in everyday legal practice, there is little reason to believe that this
situation will change significantly in the foreseeable future, despite the real efforts of the Supreme Court of Canada to promote such a change.

